

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE ® FAQEER MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR,
INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATOR,
THE PAKISTAN CRICKET BOARD.

Appeal No.1 of 2017

Sharjeel Khan.....vs.....Pakistan Cricket Board

Appeal No.2 of 2017

Pakistan Cricket Board.....vs.....Sharjeel Khan

Present


For the appellant

M/s. Shaigan Ijaz Chadhar and Saad Mazhar,
Advocates with appellant Sharjeel Khan (also
respondent in Appeal No.2 of 2017).

For the respondent

M/s. Taffazul Haider Rizvi and Mr. Haider Ali
Khan, Advocates with Mr. Salman Naseer, G.M
Law, for the P.C.B. (also the appellant in
Appeal No.2 of 2017).

Judgment /Decision.

 The above titled appeals, involving identical
questions of law and facts, call in question the decision
dated 08-09-2017 passed by the Anti-Corruption
Tribunal.

2. The appellant Sharjeel Khan is a known cricketer who participated and played cricket on behalf of Pakistan in a number of One Day Internationals as well as 20/20 Internationals.

3. On 9th February 2017, there was an opening cricket match of PSL-2 between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi played at Dubai, U.A.E. The appellant Sharjeel Khan participated/represented Islamabad United. There were allegations of spot fixing/corrupt conduct against the appellant in relation to the said match. During the course of preliminary inquiry, he was provisionally suspended by the Pakistan Cricket Board on 10th February 2017 and was repatriated to Pakistan.

4. On 13th February 2017 a notice was issued to the appellant under Article 4.3 of the Code calling upon him to appear before the Security and Vigilance Department of the Pakistan Cricket Board. The interview of the appellant was video recorded on 17th February 2017 by the Security and Vigilance Department. On 18th February 2017 a formal sheet (notice of charge) under Article 4.6 of the Code was issued to him on the following five charges:-

1.	Charge No.1	Breach of Article 2.1.1 of the Code by agreeing to fix PSL Match, played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.
2.	Charge No.2	Breach of Article 2.1.2 of the Code by ensuring for Betting and/or other corrupt purposes the occurrence of particular incident in the PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai
3.	Charge No.3	<p>Breach of Article 2.1.3 of the Code by seeking and agreeing to accept bribe and/or other Reward:-</p> <p>(a) To fix aspects of the PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.</p> <p>(b) For Betting and/or other corrupt purposes the occurrence of a particular incident in the PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.</p>
4.	Charge No.4	Breach of Article 2.4.4 of the Code by failing to disclose to the PCB Vigilance and Security department (without unnecessary delay) full details of the approaches and invitations received by Sharjeel Khan Cricketer to engage in Corrupt Conduct under the code in respect of PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.
5.	Charge No.5	Breach of Article 2.4.5 by failing to disclose to the PCB Vigilance and Security Department (without unnecessary delay) full details of the approaches and invitations received

		Khalid Latif to engage in Corrupt Conduct under the Code in respect of PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.
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5. The following are scales of penalties/sanctions for contravention of Articles 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 , 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 as shown against each charge:-

CHARGES	ANTI-CORRUPTION CODE OFFENCE	RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY	ADDITIONAL DISCRETION TO IMPOSE A FINE
Charge No.1	Breach of Article 2.1.1. of the Code by agreeing to fix PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai	A minimum of five (5) years and a maximum of a lifetime	In all cases, in addition to any period of ineligibility the Anti-Corruption Tribunal shall have the discretion to impose a fine on the participant of such amount as it deems appropriate.
Charge No.2	Breach of Article 2.1.2. the code by ensuring for Betting and/or other corrupt purposes the occurrence of particular incident in the PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.	A minimum of one (1) years and a maximum of a lifetime	
Charge No.3	<p>Breach of Article 2.1.3 of the Code by seeking and agreeing to accept bribe and/or other Reward:-</p> <p>(c) To fix aspects of the PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai.</p> <p>(b) For Betting and /other corrupt purposes the occurrence of a particular incident in the PSL Match played between Islamabad</p>	A minimum of one (1) years and a maximum of a lifetime	

	United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai	
Charge No.4	Breach of Article 2.4.4 of the Code by failing to disclose to the PCB Vigilance and Security Department (without unnecessary delay) full details of the approaches and invitations received by Sharjeel Khan Cricketer to engage in Corrupt Conduct under the Code in respect of PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai	A minimum of six (6) months and a maximum of a lifetime
Charge No.5	Breach of Article 2.4.5 by failing to disclose to the PCB Vigilance and Security Department (without unnecessary delay) full details of the approaches and invitations received Khalid Latif to engage in Corrupt conduct under the code in respect of PSL Match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai	A minimum of six (6) months and a maximum of a lifetime

6. The appellant submitted his reply dated 4th March 2017 to the charge sheet. Thereafter, his case was referred, under Article 5 of the Code, to the Anti-Corruption Tribunal constituted by the Chairman, Pakistan Cricket Board for determining charges. The Board as well as the appellant/participant submitted opening brief and

answering brief respectively to the Tribunal. The Board produced five witnesses namely P.W.1 Col. Azam Khan, P.W.2 Col. Khalid Mehmood, P.W.3. Khalid Amin, P.W.4 Salman Naseer and P.W.5 Sir Ronald Flanagan. They submitted their statements in writing and were subjected to cross examination by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant also produced three witnesses in his defence, namely R.W.1 Mr. Dean Jones as RW-1 (Cricketer), R.W.2. Sadiq Muhammad as RW-2 (Cricketer), R.W.3. Muhammad Yousaf, as RW-3 (Cricketer). They were also cross-examined by the learned counsel for the Board. The Tribunal also put certain questions to the witnesses of both the parties. In addition the Tribunal also suo moto summoned and examined Mr. Aqib Javed as TW-1 and Mr. Andrew Ephgrave TW-2 as Tribunal's witnesses. These witnesses were duly cross-examined by the learned counsel for both sides.

7. The Tribunal considered the materials and other evidence, listened the audio and viewed video recordings of the interviews of the appellant. Both sides made oral as well as written submissions before the Tribunal. By short order dated 30th August 2017, followed

by a detailed decision dated 08-09-2017, the Tribunal found the appellant Sharjeel Khan guilty of charges on all counts and awarded the following penalties/ sanctions upon him:-

**CHARGE PERIOD OF SANCTION AND
INELIGIBILITY TO PLAY CRICKET**

Charge No.1	barred and ineligible to play cricket for 05 years
Charge No.2	barred and ineligible to play cricket for 05 years
Charge No.3	barred and ineligible to play cricket for 06 months
Charge No.4	barred and ineligible to play cricket for 06 months
Charge No.5	barred and ineligible to play cricket for 06 months

All the sanctions were ordered to run concurrently and one half of the period of sanction was to remain suspended.

8. The appellant Sharjeel Khan as well as the PCB felt aggrieved with the aforesaid short order and decision of the Tribunal. Therefore, they filed Appeals No.1 and 2 of 2017 respectively, one for setting aside the decision and the other for enhancement of sanctions. The Pakistan Cricket Board assigned to me both these appeals for adjudication as an Independent Adjudicator under paragraph 37 of the Constitution of the Pakistan Cricket

Board read with article 7 of the Pakistan Cricket Boards Anti-Corruption Code for participations, 2015.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant (Sharjeel Khan who is also respondent in Appeal No.2 of 2017) vehemently argued that the audio-video recordings of interviews of the appellant at Dubai and Lahore were in flagrant violation of the provisions of Article 4.3 of PCB's Anti-Corruption Court. The Dubai interview was conducted on 09-02-2017 prior to the issuance of notice of demand. Lahore interview was recorded on 17-02-2017, just within four days, of the notice of demand dated 13-02-2013 as against the prescribed notice of 14 days. He further submitted that the Tribunal had acted contrary to law and the provisions of Article 164 of Qanoon-e-Shehadat Order while for making use of audio-video recordings, and also of recording of messages between Khalid Latif and Nasir Jamshed by means of USB device. The Tribunal acted illegally by viewing and making comparison of previous matches played by the appellant, in the absence of the appellant. Even the USB devices were not exhibited in evidence. Such material was required to be excluded from consideration. The learned counsel placed reliance on the

cases of Asfand Yar and others vs. Kamran (2016 SCMR 2084), State Life Insurance Corporation vs. Javed Iqbal (2011 SCMR 1013) Amir Yasir Ali vs. The State (2013 PC.R.L.J. 783 (Sindh) Province of Punjab vs. Rana Hakim Ali (2003 MLD 67 (Lahore) Mst. Marium Haji and others vs. Mrs. Yasmeen R. Minhas and others (PLD 2003 (Karachi) 148) in support of the above contentions.

10. He also referred to the case of Malik Umar Aslam vs. Mrs. Sumera Malik and others (2014 SCMR 451) in that the Tribunal, being a creation of a statute, conducted judicial proceedings. Therefore, it was strictly bound to follow the provisions of Qanoon-e-Shahdat Order. The learned counsel argued that there was no evidence to show that any of the PWs had any prior knowledge or information about the match fixing by the appellant. The entire story of spot fixing was cooked up after the match was over.

11. The learned counsel submitted that PW-1 Col. Muhammad Azam, despite having received phone call of Umar Amin on 06-02-2017 for a meeting did not meet him until 08-02-2017. PW-2 Col. Khalid Mehmood of PCB




had wrongly stated that Mobile Phones of Sharjeel Khan, Khalid Latif and Muhammad Irfan were secured and separated. The same were already with him well before the start of the match. There was a communication gap and language barrier between appellant and the interview panel at I.C.C. Headquarters. The Statement of PW-3 Umar Amin clearly indicated that he knew the bookie Yousaf Anwar very well and was on friendly terms with him. Therefore, no reliance could be placed on his evidence. In his cross-examination, PW-5, Sir Ronald Flanagan, Chairman of Anti-Corruption Unit I.C.C. admitted that P.W.1. Col. Muhammad Azam had exchanged some information with him. The said witness elaborated as under:-

"This included the fact that a player in the tournament had approached the Col. Azam, to report an improper approach to him and requested him to indulge in spot fixing, in the match, on the evening of 9th February, 2017. The details included that he was offered visibly coloured grips for a bat and he would engage in a elaborate stretching sign and that he will following the opening over, play 2 dot balls. The player not only refused this approach but also reported it to Col. Azam, which in my opinion every player should do."


12. The learned counsel stated that the appellant had produced RW-2 Deans Jones, Coach Peshawar Zulmi, RW-1 Sadiq Muhammad and RW-3 Muhammad Yousaf, both the former test cricketers, who supported the defence version of the appellant. Their credibility could not be impeached by the prosecution. RW-1 Deans Jones clearly stated that the appellant had played a natural game and that information about match fixing should be conveyed within 24 hours. Similarly RW-1 Sadiq Muhammad and RW-3 Muhammad Yousaf categorically stated that stretching by the appellant was a routine matter and the same could not be considered to be unusual.

13. As regards Appeal No.2 of 2017 of P.C.B., the learned counsel for Sharjeel Khan submitted that the Pakistan Cricket Board had itself exercised the power of suspended sentence in the cases of Muhammad Nawaz and Muhammad Irfan, Test Cricketers in terms of Article 5.1.12 of the Code. He also cited another precedent of one Muhammad Ashraf, a test cricketer of Bangladesh whose sanction/penalty was suspended by the Cricket Board of Bangladesh. He referred to the case of Sajjad Amjad vs. Abdul Majeed and three others (PLD 1998 Lahore 474 at



483) in that the courts were equipped with necessary enabling power to pass an order to do acts which were necessary to do substantial justice between the parties. He drew analogy of proviso to section 8 of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 (XLV of 1960) in that the appellate as well as revisional Court or authority was not empowered enhance a sentence, penalty or sanction awarded by the original court or authority.

14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent P.C.B. as well (also for the appellant P.C.B. in connected Appeal No.2 of 2017) submitted that there were exceptional circumstances existing in the present case of the appellant which justified the issuance of four days notice of demand and such a course was permissible by Article 4.3 of the Code. The USB interviews of the appellant were played before the Tribunal with the consent and in the presence of the appellant (Sharjeel Khan) and his counsel. In his interview as recorded between the night of 9/10-02-2017, the appellant substantially admitted the charges that an offer of Rs.20,000/-^{00/-} (for match fixing) was made to him as well as to another Test Cricketer Khalid Latif by one Yousaf Anwar, a bookie and a match fixer.




Somewhat similar admission was made by him in his Lahore interview in 17-07-2017 which was recorded on USB Device. The learned counsel also referred to Para 10 of the answering brief of the appellant that Yousaf Umar bookie had made an offer to him for spot fixing. The appellant intentionally failed to disclose and report promptly the vital information to the Pakistan Cricket Board Vigilance and Security Department as required by the provisions of Article 2.4.4. Similarly, he failed to report to the Pakistan Cricket Board about the offer of a similar corrupt conduct in respect of another participant Khalid Latif which was violation of Article 2.4.5 of the Code. It was proved from the evidence on record that the appellant had agreed to fix PSL match played between Islamabad United and Peshawar Zalmi on 09-02-2017 in Dubai in contravention in Article 2.1.1. and also having assured dot ball bowling in the said match in violation of Article 2.1.2. He had also agreed to accept monetary consideration to fix the PSL match and batting which was breach of Article 2.1.3 of the Code. He was made fully aware of the codal provisions before the start of the match. The learned counsel argued that as provided by Articles 1.11, 3.1 and




3.2.1 of the Code, the trial of the case against the appellant by the Tribunal merely involved the enforcement of disciplinary rules of professional conduct.

15. The learned counsel for respondent further argued that the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of a admissibility of evidence as was required in the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. He made a reference to the case of Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited vs. The Wafaqi Mohtasab (Ombudsman) and others (PLD 2001 Karachi 203). The report of Punjab Forensic Laboratory about the USB consisting audios and videos left no doubt that there was no tempering. Similarly the report of the FIA of Mobile Phone Data of the petitioner was clear in that there was no manipulation. There was sufficient and relevant evidence including circumstantial evidence to show that the appellant had, by arrangement with the bookie, played two dot balls. The statements of all the PWs were corroborated from the other positive and circumstantial evidence and material on record which proved all the charges against the appellant. Even the witnesses for the appellant like Dean Jones, Sadiq Muhammad and Muhammad Yousaf did not support the plea of innocence of the appellant. The learned




counsel submitted that Tribunal had treated the appellant very leniently by not awarding him exemplary sanction and also by suspending a part of the sanction/sentence which were required to be appropriately enhanced as prayed in Appeal No.2 of 2017.

16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties in both the appeals at considerable length and have also carefully perused their pleadings, other materials and evidence on record. At the outset, I would deal with the sheet-anchor of the preliminary submission of the learned counsel for the appellant Sharjeel Khan that the evidence and materials produced by the Pakistan Cricket Board including audio/video recording on USB were not admissible stricto- senso under the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The proceedings before the Tribunal were judicial proceedings. I find that the Pakistan Cricket Board's Anti-Corruption Code for participants, 2015 is a non-statutory instrument which has no legislative backing. It is meant for the interval use and guidance by the P.C.B., a self-regulatory body. The Anti-Corruption Tribunal constituted under the Code is just a domestic body and its proceedings cannot be considered to be




judicial proceedings by any stretch of imagination. The Tribunal is a disciplinary panel appointed by the Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board under article 5.12 of the code. Article 3.1 thereof provides that "the standards of proof shall be whether the Anti-Corruption Tribunal is comfortably satisfied that the alleged offence has been committed, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations that is made. The standard of proof in all cases is greater than a balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Similarly, Article 3.2.1 clearly states that "the Anti-Corruption Tribunal shall not be bound by the rules governing admissibility of evidence in judicial or other proceedings. Instead, facts may be established by any reliable means, including admissions and circumstances evidence".

17. The term "judicial proceedings" has not been defined by the Qanun-e-Shahadat. However the term has been defined in section 4(1)(m) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is may be legally taken on oath. There is no statute which obliges a domestic body such as the Anti-Corruption Tribunal constituted under the Code to



take evidence on oath. In my opinion, the proceedings before the Anti-Corruption Tribunal are domestic/departmental proceedings against a participant/player. These are not judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and are not governed by any statute or other legislative instrument. The object of enquiry by the Tribunal is not to determine the jural relationship between PCB and the participant but maintenance of internal discipline and to curb the professional misconduct and corrupt conduct/practices by the participants. The applicability of Qanun-e-Shahadat is, therefore, out of place in such matters even if a statement of a witness is recorded on oath in a given case.

18. This question was considered by the Superior Courts of the subcontinent in a number of cases. In Allied Bank of Pakistan (Supra) a learned Division Bench of Sindh High Court took the view that Qanun-e-Shahadat Order was not applicable in relation to proceedings before Mohatasab as the same were not judicial. In the case of Abdul Majeed vs. Malik Karam Dad, P.C.S., Election Tribunal (PLD 1966 Lahore 16), a learned Division Bench of the High Court held that the Election Tribunal, under the Electoral College Act, 1964, was not bound by the



provisions of the Code of civil procedure and the Evidence Act and that the proceedings before the Election Tribunal was not judicial.

19. In *State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa* (AIR 1963 SC 375) the Indian Supreme Court observed that:

"Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and that therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity had been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in Courts."

In *State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh* (AIR 1977 SC 1512), late Mr. Krishna Iyer, J. of the Indian Supreme Court held as under:-

"It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All

materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence....The essence of a judicial approach is objectively, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice."

In R. v. Dy. Industrial Injuries Commr., ex p Moore (1965 (1) all ER 21), Lord Justice Diplock took the view as follows:-

"Evidence is not restricted to evidence which would be admissible in a court of law. For historical reasons, based on the fear that juries who might be illiterate would be incapable of differentiating between the probative values of different methods of proof, the practice of the common law courts has been to admit only what the judges then regarded as the best evidence of any disputed fact, and thereby to exclude such material which, as a matter of common sense, would assist a fact-finding tribunal to reach a correct conclusion."

"These technical rules of evidence, however, form no part of the rules of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means no more than it must be based upon material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the occurrence of which


would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but that he must take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some probative value... If it is capable of having any probative value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom Parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp this responsibility and to substitute its own view for his."

20. I am, therefore, of the considered view that the Anti-Corruption Tribunal was not bound to follow the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat as the proceedings before it were neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature. It hardly makes any difference whether or not evidence is recorded on oath in such like domestic enquiry.

21. The evidence recorded by the Tribunal and the other materials placed before it including the audio/video recordings on the USB and played before the Tribunal were not refuted or contradicted by the appellant Sharjeel Khan in rebuttal. The appellant opted not to appear before the Tribunal as his own witness. The factum of admission of the charges, in material terms, by the appellant remained un-rebutted throughout the proceedings. He had himself voluntarily spilled the beans about the charges. It was too late in the day for him to make applications for

excluding from consideration, the audio-video recording of his interviews. The correctness of the same was never challenged or denied by him on the factual plane.


22. The evidence given by the prosecution witnesses particularly that of PW5 Sir Ronald Flanagan, Chairman, I.C.C. Anti-Corruption Unit, Dubai against the appellant was unimpeachable. The mere fact that three of P.Ws were the officers of PCB could be no ground to treat them as interested witnesses. Even the three witnesses namely Deans Jones, an Australian Player and Coach of Islamabad United, Sadiq Muhammad and Muhammad Yousaf former test cricketers, who appeared for the appellant, could not dislodge the prosecution case. The audio/video recordings on the USB device were played before and viewed by the Tribunal in the presence of the appellant himself without any demur on his part. There was sufficient and relevant material available before the Tribunal to satisfy itself that the appellant was guilty of the charges against him. The evidence of audio/video recordings was justifiably taken into consideration by the Tribunal and there was no valid reason for their exclusion.



In my view there is no merit or substance in Appeal No.1 of 2017 and applications filed by the appellant Sharjeel Khan.

23. As regards Appeal no.2 of 2017 preferred by the PCB, I find that in view of the candid admission of charges by Sharjeel Khan participant coupled with his good conduct throughout the proceedings, the Tribunal was quite justified in taking a lenient view of the matter and to impose minimum sentence on each count. The participant had not earlier been charged or found guilty of such like charges. Moreover, there is no specific prohibition in the code against a deferred sanction/ban. It was more of a procedural matter. The Tribunal could exercise its incidental and ancillary powers to defer or postpone a part of sanction/ban against a participant. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction, an authority or a court is empowered to follow any equitable procedure unless the same is prohibited by any express provision.

24. In the case of H.M. Saya vs. Co. Karachi vs. Wazir Ali Industries (PLD 1969 SC 65 (68)) there was no specific provision permitting a stranger to the suit to file an appeal. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of



Pakistan that "the Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure was to be taken as prohibited unless it was expressly provided for. To give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice. The court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers the administration of justice was permissible even if there was no express provision permitting the same".

25. In Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Lahore vs. Mst. Salma Afrooz and two others (PLD 1992 SC 263) it was found that there was no provision in the calendar of the Board providing for reevaluation of the answer books. It was held that the board was still competent to carry out reevaluation of answer books to undo perversity etc.

26. In Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad Chaudhry vs. Mumtaz Ahmad Tarar and others (2016 SCMR 1), a full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that every procedure which promoted the administration of justice was permissible unless it was expressly prohibited.

27. The impugned decision of the Tribunal is just and fair. The same does not call for any interference in these appeals which are devoid of any merit.


28. I had passed a short order dated 08-11-2017 as under:-

“For reasons to be recorded later in the judgment/decision, both the Appeals No.1 and 2, are hereby dismissed alongwith applications for exclusion of audio/video recording filed by the appellant.”

29. The above are the reasons for the short order dated 08-11-2017.

Before parting with this judgment/decision, I would like to place on record my appreciation for the valuable assistance and cooperation by the learned counsel for the parties.

Lahore
Dated: 13-11-2017


Justice (R)
Faqir Muhammad Khokhar
INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATOR